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Abstract
The corridor linking Indonesia with Malaysia is particularly rife with transborder
mobility, including large-scale labour migration. While irregularity has long
been a major feature of these flows, much of the movement now falls under
the migration regimes adopted by Malaysia and Indonesia. Long-established
casual migration flows collide with recently codified norms and, as a result,
oscillate between regularity and irregularity. This paper explores the following
questions: How does the regulatory state view and handle undocumented
migrants? How does it interact with established social networks that have
facilitated irregular labour migration? Particular attention is given to the
distinction between the categories of  deportable criminals and victims deserving
protection, as ascribed by state actors to certain groups of migrants. Based on
interviews with twelve deported Florenese migrant workers, the paper discusses
how the Indonesian-Malaysian migration regime seeks to shape mobility. It
argues that shifting categorisations reflect political imperatives more than the
migrants’ needs that prompt them to migrate in the first place.
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Introduction
Irregularity has long been a major feature in Indonesia’s labour migration.
The corridor linking the country with Malaysia is particularly rife with this
irregular transborder mobility. Since colonial times, migrants from the island
of  Flores have plied the route both to East and West Malaysia in search of
better livelihoods and adventure.1 Much of this movement now falls under
the migration regimes adopted by Malaysia and Indonesia. Consequently, long-
established casual migration flows now collide with recently codified norms.
Migrants have developed a wide array of responses to this new challenge,
ranging from outright resistance to reluctant compliance with legal
requirements. As a result, migration flows oscillate between regularity and
irregularity.
A crucial element in these dynamics is the desire of the state, both in Malaysia
and Indonesia, to bring the cross-border movement of people under its
control. The underlying logic is strongly informed by economic considerations,
given the income and employment gaps between the two neighbouring
countries. While Indonesia suffers from chronic unemployment and low wages,
Malaysia’s economy depends heavily on foreign workers, who make up around
15 to 25 per cent of the total labour force.2 Labour migration between the two
countries offers real opportunities to address these issues, and the prospect
of mutual benefits has encouraged the two governments to facilitate the
movement of workers, notwithstanding occasional tensions illustrated by
the deportation of around 400,000 Indonesian migrants from Malaysia in
2002.3
1 I B Mantra, ‘Indonesian Labour Mobility to Malaysia (A case study: East Flores,
West Lombok, and the Island of  Bawean)’ in Sukamdi, A Haris and P Brownlee
(eds.), Labour Migration in Indonesia: Policies and practice, Population Studies Centre
UGM, Yogyakarta, 2000, pp. 143–184.
2 Given an unknown number of undocumented migrant workers, figures reported
vary considerably. An old estimate from 2008 quotes a figure of  25 per cent. See: V
Kanapathy, Controlling Irregular Migration: The Malaysian experience, ILO, Bangkok,
2008. More recent survey data for 2016 mention 15.6 per cent (Labour Force
Survey), 17 per cent (National Employment Returns), and 24.4 per cent (independent
estimate). See: L Hwok-Aun and K Y Leng, ‘Counting Migrant Workers in Malaysia:
A needlessly persisting conundrum’, ISEAS Perspective, no. 25, 2018, pp. 7–8.
3 M Ford, ‘After Nunukan: The regulation of  Indonesian migration to Malaysia’ in A
Kaur and I Metcalfe (eds.) Mobility, Labour Migration and Border Controls in Asia,
Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, pp. 228–247.
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Modern statecraft determined to bring about social order is well captured in
James Scott’s Seeing Like A State (1998).4 Scott highlights how nation-states
are premised on a vision of large-scale social engineering and seek to develop
the requisite capacity and tools. In this context, society is often perceived as a
chaotic entity separate from the state: ‘[It] became an object that the state
might manage and transform with a view toward perfecting it.’5 The
improvement of all members of society is a central purpose of the modern
state, in addition to the classic goals of taxation, conscription and prevention
of rebellion. At the same time, similar to earlier efforts at theorising the
modern state,6 Scott’s work points out the flip side of  state ambitions to
order social life. Social engineering is necessarily schematic and limited; it
objectifies society and conceptualises its features according to its own needs,
such as the requirements of urban planning, industrial production, settlement
or land ownership. This simplified picture or map feeds into plans for control
and interventions, which are often at odds with a functioning social order.
Little wonder, therefore, that such efforts often fall short of their objectives
and, in some cases, yield disastrous results as the tragedies cited in Scott’s
book illustrate.
Labour migration policies are a case in point: they frame the movement of
people in terms of national interests including economic growth and border
control.7 However, such policies often ignore the social and political
dimensions of labour migration, especially in a context where social networks
significantly shape migration opportunities. This paper unpacks these complex
dimensions as ‘systematically interlinked technologies, institutions, and actors
that facilitate and condition mobility’.8 Different factors are at play, colliding,
collaborating and shaping mobility. An important element in the process are
the shifts in the designation of migrants, who are in some context seen as
criminals deserving punishment and in others as victims meriting help and
4 J C Scott, Seeing Like A State, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1998.
5 Ibid., p. 92.
6 Z Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991.
7 M Ford, L Lyons and W van Schendel, ‘Labour Migration and Human Trafficking:
An introduction’ in M Ford, L Lyons and W van Schendel (eds.), Labour Migration
and Human Trafficking in Southeast Asia: Critical perspectives, Routledge, Abingdon,
2012, pp. 1–22.
8 J Lindquist and B Xiang, ‘The Infrastructural Turn in Asian Migration’ in G Liu-
Farrer and B S A Yeoh (eds.) Routledge Handbook of  Asian Migrations, Routledge,
London, 2018, p. 154.
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protection—a contradiction that has attracted interest in research within critical
trafficking and deportation studies.9
Following the deportation from Malaysia of twelve migrant workers from
Raburia village in Ende district, Flores, Indonesia, this paper discusses how
the experience of deportation is shaped by shifting legal regimes in Malaysia
and Indonesia, as well as by the migrants’ multiple vulnerabilities. Arrested
and punished as criminals in Malaysia, the twelve workers were deported back
to Indonesia, where state authorities treated them as victims.
Modern Statecraft in Controlling Migration
For Malaysia and Indonesia, necessities dictate the management of migrant
workers. Although labour importation had started in colonial times, Malaysia’s
reliance on migrant workers became more acute after the start of the export-
industrialisation drive in the early 1980s, which triggered massive urbanisation
at the expense of the agricultural sector. In-migration at that stage was perceived
only as a temporary solution to ‘sustain labour market demand and to maintain
Malaysia as a favourable site to foreign investors’.10
Over the years, it became clear that the demand for migrant workers was
anything but temporary. Employment prospects in Malaysia motivated
Indonesian workers to cross the border even without proper documents,
their movement facilitated by a relaxed attitude to irregularity among many
state officials on both sides of  the border. To illustrate, the number of  irregular
migrant workers in Malaysia increased from an estimated 1.9 million in 2010
to 2.5 million in 2014.11 In addition, a tacit recognition of  Malaysia’s heavy
reliance on foreign labour often revealed itself in policy reversals following
9 S Plambech, ‘Between “Victims” and “Criminals”: Rescue, deportation and everyday
violence among Nigerian migrants’, Social Politics, vol. 21, no. 3, 2014, pp. 382–402;
E Paasche, ML Skilbrei and S Plambech, ‘Vulnerable Here or There? Examining the
vulnerability of victims of human trafficking before and after return’, Anti-Trafficking
Review, issue 10, 2018, pp. 34–51.
10 E S Devadason and C W Meng, ‘Policies and Laws Regulating Migrant Workers in
Malaysia: A critical appraisal’, Journal of  Contemporary Asia, vol. 44, no. 1, 2014, p.
22.
11 C C Low and K S Mokhtar, ‘Deportation Turn in Malaysia: Expansion, discourse
and practice’, Journal of  Population and Social Studies, vol. 25, no. 2, 2017, p. 148.
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crackdowns on irregular migrants.12 Such reversals are actually indicators of
different views among state institutions regarding migrant workers. The
Malaysian Ministry of Human Resources and other related ministries recognise
the importance of  foreign labour to the economy. On the other hand, the
Ministry of Home Affairs sees migrant workers as a security issue that has to
be responded to with increased surveillance and reduction in numbers.
Irrespective of occasional reversals, Malaysian policies have shown an overall
trend towards increased border control. Low and Mokhtar describe the country’s
current migration governance as a ‘deportation regime’ and divide its
development into four periods: 1) pre-1992 (securitisation of operations); 2)
1992–2002 (militarisation of operations); 3) 2002–2010 (zero-tolerance policy);
and 4) post-2010 (deportation turn).13 Each period is characterised by
increasingly punitive policy measures. For example, in 1992 the government
launched the two-pronged Operation Expunge (Ops Nyah) to counter irregular
migration. While the police assumed responsibility for preventing new arrivals
(Ops Nyah I), the military was deployed to arrest irregular migrants already in
the country (Ops Nyah II). Caning was introduced in 1997 for ‘double backers’,
or deportees who returned to Malaysia as irregular migrants, and expanded to
first-time offenders in 2002. A biometric system was launched in 2005 to
prevent re-entry. In the 2010s, the government fundamentally reformed the
‘deportation regime’ by increasing the capacity of detention centres, by
expediting trials and deportations and by collaborating with the governments
of sending countries and with international agencies such as the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross
and the International Organization for Migration. As of 2015, the Malaysian
government ran fourteen permanent and three temporary detention facilities
with a total capacity of 18,350 inmates.14
Across the border, the Indonesian government responded to the end of the
oil bonanza in the early 1980s by initiating labour out-migration policies ‘to
mitigate the unemployment problem, to increase skills and working experience
abroad and to improve the foreign exchange position’.15 Indonesia joined a
growing group of developing countries with labour surpluses, which integrated
12 Kanapathy.
13 Low and Mokhtar, p. 148.
14 Ibid., p. 155.
15 G Cremer, ‘Deployment of Indonesian Migrants in the Middle East: Present situation
and prospects’, Bulletin of  Indonesian Economic Studies, vol. 24, no. 3, 1988, p. 78.
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overseas employment into their national development strategies.16 Formal
protections only came much later with Law no. 39 of  2004 on the protection
and placement of Indonesian overseas workers, and its subsequent
replacement, Law no. 18 of  2017. Over time, migrant workers’ contributions
to the national economy increased steadily. By 2015, remittances had reached
USD 10.5 billion and amounted to just over one per cent of  the country’s
GDP.17 Government parlance accordingly glorifies migrant workers as ‘pahlawan
devisa’ or ‘heroes of foreign exchange’.
Such narratives of success are often accompanied by reports about the hardship
and abuses suffered by Indonesian workers abroad. Accounts from the early
period of labour migration painted a gloomy picture: workers suffered from
‘very long working hours, sometimes from dawn to after midnight, payments
below the amount stated in the contract, delays in payment, berating and
beating, or sexual abuse and rape’.18 A report on Indonesian plantation workers
in Sabah, Malaysia, described their conditions as ‘bonded labour…a modern
kind of slavery’.19
Public outcries and pressures from civil society groups bore fruit with the
ratification of the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of  Their Families in 2012. However, it took five years and
various legal drafts before a new law implementing the Convention was passed
(Law no. 18 of  2017). This protracted legislative process suggests that labour
migration is still very much a contested space between business profitability
and efficiency, on the one hand, and measures to provide protection to workers,
on the other.
These shifts in government policies and narratives help condition the mobility
of migrant workers. The regulatory dimension of the migration regime
prescribes the appropriate treatment of migrants in various situations and
informs the reactions of people around them, but, as I argue in this paper, it
does not always produce the intended perceptions and experiences of migration
on the part of the migrants themselves.
16 C B Chin, ‘Walls of  Silence and Late Twentieth Century Representations of  the
Foreign Female Domestic Worker: The case of  Filipina and Indonesian female
servants in Malaysia’, International Migration Review, vol. 31, no. 2, 1997, pp. 353–385.
17 World Bank, Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016, World Bank, Geneva, 2016, p.
21.
18 Cremer, pp. 81–82.
19 T M Li, ‘To Make Live or Let Die? Rural dispossession and the protection of  surplus
populations’, Antipode, vol. 41, 2009, p. 77.
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Methods
This paper is based on a research project to understand the phenomenon of
repatriation, funded by the migration network of the Jesuit Conference of
Asia Pacific (JCAP). Primary data were collected by interviewing twelve Florenese
male construction workers, ranging from 16 to 56 years of age, who were
deported from Malaysia having been caught without proper documents in
September 2015. Employment on plantations and in the construction sector
in Malaysia is taken up mostly by migrant workers, comprising around 70 per
cent of the sectors’ total workforce in 2014, according to the Malaysian
Employers Federation.20 Men dominate the physically demanding work in
these sectors, and Florenese men, in particular, are perceived as capable of such
hard outdoor labour, thought to resemble work in their home villages.
The interviews took place in February 2016, while the workers were in a
temporary shelter in Jakarta, and on two separate occasions in June and
November 2016, when they were back home. In the shelter, group interviews
were conducted because it was difficult to arrange separate conversations in a
crowded space. Moreover, an exclusive interview would have made the
respondent stand out and feel uncomfortable. In the village, two local contact
persons helped establish rapport with the village chief, who himself had gone
twice to Malaysia as a plantation worker. The chief knew the deportees and
their stories and endorsed my fieldwork, which, given his authority, facilitated
my interviews. In the safety of  their home village, the respondents were more
outspoken, although private interviews still made them uncomfortable because
they were not familiar with the concept of  interviewing. In the end, four of
the twelve agreed to be interviewed individually while the others were
interviewed as a group. All twelve agreed to the publication of  their names. A
longer stay with the respondents would probably have yielded richer insights,
but the JCAP research grant was very limited and could not support more
extensive fieldwork.
To corroborate the data, interviews were also conducted with ten other former
male migrant workers in Malaysia from a neighbouring village. These men
went to Malaysia in different periods but their experiences confirmed the stories
of  the migrants from Raburia: undocumented mobility, multiple entries to
Malaysia, working in plantations and construction sites, arrest and deportation.
The fieldwork also included interviews with five local activists and three officials
from local authorities in Ende district, who were responsible for labour
20 Hwok-Aun and Leng, p. 7.
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migration affairs. Further, government records in Jakarta and in Ende
supplement the interview data.
Criminalising a Functioning Labour Migration
The ordeal of the twelve returnees from Raburia in Ende began when the van
they were travelling in was stopped by the police on a road in Kampung Gajah
area in Perak, Malaysia, in the middle of the night sometime in September
2015. They were part of the 256 irregular migrants that were arrested daily that
year, of whom one third were Indonesians.21 Up to that point, the men had
been working as a group for the same employer on a construction site. That
evening they were being transported to a new site where they were to start
their work the following morning. When the men could not produce
documents, the police immediately detained them along with the Malaysian
driver, who was released shortly afterwards.
Despite hailing from the same village and being arrested as a group, the men
actually did not come to Malaysia at the same time. Xaverius (42 years old) and
Bartolomeus (30 years old) were veteran migrants who had been in and out of
Malaysia four times, each lasting from one to two years; Kasimirus (40 years
old) had been to Malaysia three times; and the teenager Heribertus (17 years
old) had previously been to Malaysia when he was only 12 years old. For the
others, this was their first migration to Malaysia, and they had been in the
country between one and six months prior to the arrest. All of them were
never in possession of proper documents while in Malaysia.
The men had known each other, being neighbours and some even relatives in
the same village. In fact, it is quite common for Indonesian migrants to bring
friends and relatives to Malaysia to work in the same place, a practice that is
encouraged and facilitated by employers. Xaverius brought his neighbour with
him when going back to Malaysia for the second time, and Heribertus followed
his uncle to work in a plantation back in 2011. The village network or indeed
the network of people from the same district shapes the migration process in
a way that has become convenient to both migrants and employers: the migrants
need not spend time looking for jobs while the employers can access a pool of
labourers from a distance. Furthermore, this informal channel reduces costs
both for the employers, who circumvent the requirements for work permits,
21 Low and Mokhtar, p. 157.
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and for the prospective workers, who bypass lengthy and bribery-ridden
placement bureaucracies.22
The same network supports the return of the migrants. Extensive knowledge
of the migration route and leverage with relevant officials on both sides of
the border facilitate a smooth journey back home. Indeed, the border between
the two countries is made porous partly by corrupt immigration officers,
whose involvement is often ignored in law enforcement efforts targeting only
migrants and their immediate handlers.23
The current circular labour migration inserts itself into a long-established
pattern linking Flores and Malaysia. Seafaring communities had moved within
the region long before the colonial era. The British added a new dimension to
these migratory flows when they imported foreign workers from South China,
the Philippines, India and Indonesia for the growing economy of colonial
Malaya. Some of these workers settled and later became citizens of independent
Malaysia.24 Once established, networks of migrants often acted as sponsors
and helped to facilitate the arrival of more migrant workers when there was
demand in subsequent periods. The influx of migrants from Flores, in
particular, became greater after the introduction of large-scale agricultural estates
and the rise of the timber industry in the 1950s.25 Combining traditional
kinship networks and trans-border mobility, the Florenese over time
established a vast network of labour migration with outposts in many places
along the routes that connect Flores and Malaysia. In fact, given the extent of
the network that now straddles the border between Indonesia and Malaysia in
places like East and West Kalimantan and the Riau Islands, one scholar suggests
that the Florenese constitute an embryonic transnational community.26
The arrest of the twelve migrant workers by the Malaysian authorities
interrupted this otherwise functioning system of labour allocation. Driven by
the vision of order, the authorities committed what Scott calls ‘state
22 G Hugo, ‘Best Practice in Temporary Labour Migration for Development: A
perspective from Asia and the Pacific’, International Migration, vol. 47, no. 5, 2009, p.
30.
23 A M Nah, ‘Globalisation, Sovereignty and Immigration Control: The hierarchy of
rights for migrant workers in Malaysia’, Asian Journal of  Social Science, vol. 40, no. 4,
2012, pp. 486–508.
24 Mantra, p. 144.
25 R Tirtosudarmo, On the Politics of  Migration: Indonesia and beyond, LIPI Press, Jakarta,
2015, p. 217.
26 Ibid., p. xxxv.
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simplification’ in treating the detained men mainly as individuals to be
punished for a criminal activity. Just the same, some scholars suggest that the
Malaysian policies on in-migration are deliberately designed to leave a grey area
that can be exploited to fulfil the continuous demand for migrant workers.27
In any event, arrests by the authorities do not always spell the end of
employment in Malaysia. The presence of millions of undocumented migrant
workers would not be possible without some degree of complicity on the
part of  the authorities. Arrests sometimes simply serve as a way to solicit
bribes. Xaverius and his friends noted that they actually tried to offer some
money to the policemen that night. However, the checkpoint was being
supervised by a high-ranking officer and so the policemen on duty did not
accept the bribes offered.
The police took the group to a detention facility in Sri Iskandar. After three
weeks, the men were transferred to a prison in Taiping, where they had to go
on trial. They were found guilty of working irregularly and sentenced to six
months’ imprisonment, for which the authorities moved them to yet another
prison in Tapah. Life in detention was hard, and the money the men had on
them at the time of their arrest was taken away without explanation. When
the men had served two-thirds of  their term in Tapah prison, the Malaysian
authorities deported the group to Indonesia.
The Construction of Victimhood in Indonesia
Once the men set foot on Indonesian soil, the social protection regime kicked
in. Unlike in Malaysia, the migrants were not treated as criminals, although
they had clearly broken the Indonesian laws on migrant worker placement and
immigration. Instead, the Indonesian authorities treated the men as victims
deserving assistance and protection. This response came automatically—
officials made no attempt to check whether the men had suffered any injustice
or exploitation. In particular, nothing was done to ascertain whether they had
become victims of  human trafficking. The authorities’ approach was probably
informed by a popular perception that the government is incapable of
protecting its own citizens.28
27 Devadason and Meng.
28 Public outcries criticising perceived government inaction usually follow news of
Indonesian migrant workers executed abroad for alleged crimes or when cases of
abuse surface, such as the one about Erwiana who was physically tortured by her
employer in Hong Kong in 2013.
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For a number of reasons, however, treatment as victims does not necessarily
qualify returnees to seek redress in the Indonesian justice system. First,
provisions for redress mainly concern administrative dispute resolutions and
insurance schemes, which only apply to documented migrants. Second, the
Indonesian judicial system (e.g. for cases of  human trafficking) is notoriously
treacherous. Individuals seeking justice face systemic barriers such as cost,
time, the need for expertise as well as perceived bias and corruption. In
addition, migrant workers often suffer from multiple vulnerabilities such as
poverty, low levels of  education and little formal work experience, rendering
the barriers to justice even greater.
The provision of state protection comes together under the policy framework
for ‘Pekerja Migran Bermasalah’ (PMB), or ‘Migrant Workers with Problems’.29
The Decree of  the Minister of  Social Welfare no. 22/2013 defines these as:
‘Indonesian overseas migrant workers who have no work permits, legal
documents, and/or who work in violation of their work permits, [and have]
encountered problems in terms of violence, exploitation, deportation, neglect,
social disharmony, [or] inability for self-adjustment.’ The decree also stipulates
that the Ministry of  Social Welfare is responsible for repatriating the returnees
from the point of arrival in Indonesia to their home province where regional
governments take over the process and provide them with transportation to
their home districts and eventually on to their villages.
This shift in the categorisation of the men as they returned from Malaysia to
Indonesia reflects the ongoing discussion about the linkage between
‘deportable criminals and virtuous victims deserving of  protection’.30 Indeed,
as has been highlighted in research on other populations, both criminalisation
in Malaysia and victimhood in Indonesia do not reflect the main experiences
of the deported individuals, as illustrated later.
From Port Klang in Malaysia, the group arrived in Tanjung Balai, North
Sumatra, and was immediately taken to a rehabilitation centre for victims of
domestic violence and exploitation, run by the Ministry of  Social Welfare and
known as Rumah Perlindungan dan Trauma Centre (RPTC), or House of
Protection and Trauma Centre. The shelter authorities banned the men from
29 For extensive descriptions of  Indonesia’s legal frameworks of  assistance for
trafficking victims, migrant workers and vulnerable persons, see: R Surtees et al.,
Going Home. Challenges in the reintegration of trafficking victims in Indonesia, Nexus
Institute, Washington DC, 2016.
30 See, for example, Plambech’s work on Nigerian sex workers in Europe; Plambech,
p. 384.
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going out—a measure usually taken to prevent a return to Malaysia. Although
the migrants from Flores found themselves confined to the facility, the regime
of the shelter did not include any activities to help them pass their time. After
ten long days, the men were taken by boat to Tanjung Priok port in Jakarta.
Upon arrival, the authorities gave each of them IDR 250,000 (USD 17.5) as
pocket money, and they were immediately taken to the RPTC in East Jakarta
run by the Ministry of  Social Welfare, a large facility handling an increasing
number of PMBs.31
The mandate of RPTCs as outlined in the Decree of the Ministry of Social
Welfare no. 102/2007 is quite comprehensive. The centres are to provide food,
temporary accommodation, and clothing to their clients and to offer healthcare,
including psycho-social rehabilitation and trauma healing. The shelters are
also supposed to prepare the returnees for reintegration with their families
and communities, in collaboration with regional governments. Moreover, the
RPTCs play the role of  crisis centres. Finally, they are tasked with gathering
information from returnees and running public information campaigns on
migration.
However, an internal review commissioned by the Ministry in 2015 criticised
the centres for failing to meet their responsibilities.32 RPTCs operate on a very
small budget and each institution only employs one or two civil servants,
who work as the coordinator and secretary, assisted by volunteers. The review
mentions, for example, how the RPTC in Bambu Apus Jakarta struggles with
the financial burden of having to feed and repatriate an increasing number of
deported migrants. High medication bills for serious cases of illness or injury
stretch the meagre budget even further. The recently established national health
insurance scheme is of little help as it requires identity documents that
undocumented migrants are lacking.
The twelve men from Raburia luckily did not have serious physical or mental
problems. It was mostly boredom that troubled them while in the shelter.
They spent about a week in the facility until, on 13 February 2016, they were
taken back to Tanjung Priok port from where they travelled by boat to Maumere
in Flores. No staff from the RPTC or from any government agency
31 In 2013, this facility handled 763 returnee migrants; in 2014, the figure was 935;
and by June 2015, the figure was already 769; Kementrian Sosial, Perlindungan Sosial
Pekerja Migran Bermasalah melalui Rumah Perlindungan Trauma Center, Kementrian
Sosial, Jakarta, 2015, p. 35.
32 Husmiati et al., Perlindungan Sosial Pekerja Migran Bermasalah melalui Rumah Perlindungan
Trauma Center, P3KS Press, Jakarta, 2015.
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accompanied them on the trip. They were given tickets, a little more money
and an official cover letter to be handed over to the Dinas Sosial, the Office of
Social Welfare, in Maumere. The boat took four days to reach the men’s
destination. Once disembarked, the group was supposed to go to the Dinas,
report their arrival and receive further assistance, but by the time the vessel
reached the port it was late in the evening, and the office of the Dinas was
closed. Although aware of the instructions from Jakarta, the men ‘could not
be bothered to wait until dawn to access the Dinas’ as Xaverius, the de facto
leader of  the group, would later report. ‘[They] simply wanted to get home as
soon as possible.’ Their village could not be directly reached by cars. From
Maumere, it would take them about four hours on the road to travel to a
point from which relatives could take them home on motorbikes. The men
decided to use what remained of the pocket money they had received for the
trip and mobilised their kinship network to arrange their journey.
The repatriation procedure stipulates that, once returnees arrive in the provincial
port, the local government agencies will take over from the ministry and
accompany them to their home villages. In reality, no one in the Dinas in
Maumere or Ende was aware of the Raburia returnees. ‘I have double-checked.
We do not know anything about the deported migrants from Raburia,’
confided Romanus Tato, the head of  the department of  social security and
assistance of  the Dinas Sosial in Ende. Similarly, Yoseva Dewi, the head of  the
responsible department in the Dinas Tenaga Kerja, or Labour Agency, in Ende
knew nothing of them.
This lack of coordination is often blamed on the decentralisation policy that
started in 2001 as part of the political reform following the demise of the
New Order regime. Decentralisation is supposed to encourage greater public
participation in development by transferring some of the powers from Jakarta
to the regions. It is meant as a means of  improving public services, reducing
inefficiency and corruption, and deepening democracy.33 Under this policy,
local governments are authorised to reorganise departmental offices and
reallocate the resources according to their priorities. Whatever its benefits in
other areas, however, the decentralisation policy often complicates coordination
between the various levels of government.
33 J Manor, The Political Economy of  Democratic Decentralization, The World Bank,
Washington DC, 1999; A Dasgupta and V A Beard, ‘Community Driven Development,
Collective Action and Elite Capture in Indonesia’, Development & Change, vol. 38,
no. 2, 2007, pp. 229–249.
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The Ministry of  Social Welfare and the related Dinas in the regions are part of
a special task force, or satgas, that is responsible to facilitate the safe return of
deported migrants in each region. Other members are delegated by the
coordinating Ministry of  People’s Welfare, the Ministry of  Home Affairs, the
Ministry of Law and Human Rights, the Ministry of Labour and
Transmigration, the Ministry of  Health, the Ministry of  Women’s
Empowerment and Child Protection and the National Agency for the
Protection and Placement of  Indonesian Migrant Workers (BNP2TKI).34 In
reality, though, only officials from the local Dinas of  Social Welfare, the local
Dinas of  Labour and Transmigration, and the local representatives of  BNP2TKI
are present in the field, albeit not always in a coordinated manner. On various
occasions, officials from the agencies complained about the lack of collaboration
and a culture of  blaming other institutions in areas of  shared responsibility.35
Life after Deportation
Back in the village, the men quickly resumed their routines in the field, but
problems remained: all had taken out loans to finance their trip to Malaysia
and were struggling to repay their debts—an issue also documented by another
study on migrant workers in the area.36 According to the villagers interviewed,
locals typically borrow money from loan sharks who charge a fixed annual
interest rate of 100 per cent even if the debtor can repay the loan in a period
shorter than a year.
Such was the case of Heribertus. For his first trip to Malaysia, his mother
borrowed 3 million rupiah (USD 226). After four months, he had earned
enough to repay the debt of  6 million rupiah, including interest. Similarly,
Bartolomeus had borrowed 5.5 million rupiah so that his total debt, including
interest, amounted to 11 million (USD 828). Before he got caught, he had
34 Under the Presidential Decree no. 106 of  2004, this task force is called the
Coordination Team for the Repatriation of  Indonesian Migrant Workers with
Problems and Their Families or TK-PTKIB in its Indonesian acronym. This legislation
has been replaced by the more generic Presidential Regulation no. 45 of  2013,
which does not significantly change the substance of  the old law.
35 Husmiati et al., p. 60.
36 G Hugo, ‘International Labour Migration and Village Dynamics: A study of  Flores,
East Nusa Tenggara’ in T R Leinbach (ed.), The Indonesian Rural Economy: Mobility,
work and enterprise, Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2004, pp. 120–
122.
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paid 6 million rupiah from his savings of 11 months and now still had to
find another 5 million. A third member of  the group, Yohanes, had taken out
a loan of 2 million rupiah (USD 145) and had to repay 4 million. Having
worked for just a month before deportation, though, he had no money left to
settle his debt.
‘It is hard here. We really struggle to make ends meet. Food is not a problem,
but other expenses are difficult,’ said Bartolomeus, referring in particular to
his child’s school fees. He added, ‘I have a plan to go back to Malaysia.’ Xaverius
was not yet decided, but would not exclude the possibility of returning to
Malaysia. ‘For me it would not be so soon. I do not know for sure.’ These
anecdotal accounts help to shed light on the reason why people from this
region have continued to embark on the risky migration to Malaysia.
Indebtedness, lack of education and job opportunities continue to haunt
them while irregular migration, facilitated in part by established social networks,
offers a real opportunity.37 Treatment as victims by Indonesian authorities
does nothing to improve the living conditions of deported returnees, nor
does the criminalisation of irregular migrants in Malaysia provide an effective
deterrent. In other words, while the criminal/victim categorisation helps to
shape mobility, it does not significantly change the structure of  migration
opportunities.
Further, the twelve men at the focus of this study did not face blame and
rejection by their families or community for their failed adventure. At the time
of  the interviews, 20 out of  179 families in the village had at least one of  their
members, mostly men, working in Malaysia. As their remittances are essential
for the families, their absence is seen as normal and potential failure of a
migration as an accepted risk. This assessment is consistent with Surtees’s
study on the reintegration of trafficked men from Java island, and in contrast
with the negative reactions returning migrant women often have to face from
their communities.38
37 E Spaan and T van Naersen, ‘Migration Decision Making and Migration Industry in
the Indonesia-Malaysia Corridor’, Journal of  Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 44, no.
4, 2018, pp. 680–695. See also: N van Hear, O Bakewell, and K Long, ‘Drivers of
Migration’, Migrating out of  Poverty Research Programme Consortium Working Paper 1,
University of  Sussex, Brighton, 2012, p. 15.
38 R Surtees, ‘At Home: Family reintegration of  trafficked Indonesian men’, Anti-
Trafficking Review, issue 10, 2018, pp. 70–87. See also: E Prusinski, ‘Wasted Talent’,
Inside Indonesia, 12 April 2014, retrieved 23 July 2018, http://
www.insideindonesia.org/wasted-talent.
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Conclusion
The labour migration route that connects Indonesia and Malaysia brings
together two distinct logics of operation—one of the state and another of
social networks—each having distinct actors, forces and strategies. The
regulatory infrastructure of the state has tried to rein in the social and
commercial infrastructures of the Florenese transnational community both at
the sending and receiving ends, but it gives little consideration to the
complexities that inform the reproduction of labour migration and the
vulnerabilities experienced by rural populations from Indonesia’s outer
provinces. The study of deportation offers a glimpse into those complexities.
The Indonesian and Malaysian governments do not fully recognise the ways
in which the social networks of Florenese migrants shape opportunities,
sanction movements and give meaning to labour migration so that village
families can reap its economic benefits. The increasingly punitive migration
regime devised as a tool of statecraft by Malaysia designated the Raburia men
as criminals, ignoring their need for earning a living and supporting their
families. Indonesian authorities, by contrast, under pressure for being unable
to create employment and provide protections, responded by treating the
returnee migrants as victims. In other words, both governments insist on
working within the legal frameworks that primarily serve their national interests,
but ignore the living conditions and needs of the migrants and their families.
The deported migrants interviewed for this study fully understood the risks
and consequences of migrating without documents, but did not consider
themselves victims or criminals. The shifting identification of criminal/victim
reflects political imperatives more than the experiences of the migrants, who
do not take centre stage and for whom the policies offer little innovation.
Thus, perceiving migration like a state will not change significantly the
established mobility pattern of undocumented migrants.
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